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This paper surveys and critiques the current market failures approach (MFA) to business ethics,
beginning with the concept of market inefficiencies as introduced by Coasian transaction costs
and progressing to the concept of market failures as discussed in Arrowvian information costs.
The second section outlines contemporary constructions of MFA. At the macroscopic level,
MFA is justified with Pareto efficiency, generating its characteristic efficiency imperatives and
their derivative implications of metavoluntarism. The third section outlines the use of agency
theory and professionalism norms within microeconomics to evidence MFA’s attractiveness.
The final section advances a critique of MFA based on the general theory of second best,
finding MFA irrelevant, because its fundamental premises do not obtain in a dynamic capitalist
economy, and unreasonable in its expectations of individual human behavior.

From Inefficiency to Failure: Ronald Coase and Kenneth Arrow
The New Institutional Economics movement of the 1930s, beginning with Ronald Coase,
sought to explain the existence of firms within a specialized market economy. Coase viewed
firms as consciously planned bubbles of entrepreneurial direction in a sea of decentralized
market relations, which self-regulated to Pareto optimality through the invisible hand of the
price mechanism.1 Firms earn profit by more efficiently coordinating economic activity,
superseding the market price mechanism. Firms’ primary comparative advantages include
reducing costs of obtaining information about relevant prices, and reducing costs of
negotiating and concluding spot contracts.2 For example, entrepreneurs direct a firm’s
resources to economize on market transaction costs through long-term contracts, which
eliminate repeat negotiation costs and allow employers to delay specifying the precise terms of
the contract.3 Thus, firms exist where organizing costs are less than transaction costs, while
markets exist where organizing costs exceed transaction costs. Known as the ‘make-or-buy’
decision, a firm expands until marginal organizing costs equal either market transaction costs
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or a competitor firm’s organizing costs. The economy’s market-firm structure is thus
characterized by substitution at the margins of the relative costs of coordination. Furthermore,
the Coasian supersession of the price mechanism is not due to market failure; for example,
markets can evidently create long-term contracts as well. Rather, Coase is acknowledging that
entrepreneurs and organizations can be more efficient than markets, particularly around
contracting.
For Kenneth Arrow, firms exist where markets exhibit avoidable inefficiencies and where the
price system fundamentally fails to secure the benefits of collective action. Consistent with
Coase, Arrow contends that the authority derived from employment contracts holds price
relations and adversarial contracting in partial abeyance within firms.4 However, where Coase
identifies market inefficiencies, Arrow explains that that incomplete information signifies the
market’s failure to process the intrinsic uncertainty of reality. Market failures manifest in
contracting problems of hidden actions and information (i.e., moral hazard, adverse selection),
exemplified by the inability of the information structure of the price system to price and
allocate risk-bearing.5 Firms use long-term employment contracts to exploit the aggregate
decision-making faculties of many individuals, who sift through the random noise of an
uncertain world, code information necessary for decision-making, and thus retransmit a
significantly reduced volume of information to the firm’s top decision-makers.6 Coded
retransmission constitutes firms’ ability to handle uncertainty where the market fails to,
earning profit by generating increasing returns to the uses of information.7
The contemporary market failures approach develops from a general concept of market failures,
additionally evoking the functionalist Arrowvian account of the role of firms in a market
society. Economic rationality and liberal morality define ‘better’ social organization as Pareto
efficient, such that no other system makes everyone ‘better’ off according pluralistic individual
values. Thus, social systems organize collective action for collective improvement, regulating
competition for resources, securing gains from specialization, and allocating the benefits of
joint production.8 The price system achieves enormous efficiency gains through supply and
demand, requiring only minimal knowledgeability of participants, creating a sense of freedom,
and promising to correct for aggregate effects of individual action.9
However, the market system rewards selfishness, overlooks distributive justice, and struggles to
process immaterial ‘commodities’ essential to efficient markets—specifically, trust, loyalty, and
truthfulness. Pareto optimality is indeterminate regarding distributive justice; any points along
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the efficiency frontier are equally optimal. Moreover, the incommensurability and incomplete
communicability of individual values means that the choice amongst societal allocations is
ultimately determined purely by power relations.10 The limited ability of markets to govern
distribution is thus due not only to market imperfections (i.e., externalities), but also to a
fundamental incompatibility with private morality and indeterminacy regarding justice.
Accordingly, Arrow argues that collective action and resource allocation require nonmarket
governance where the price system fails. ‘Invisible institutions’ of ethical and moral principles,
which support trust and reciprocity, are therefore essential to societies that wish to harness the
productivity of the price system.

Falling in Love with Economics: The Market Failures Approach to
Business Ethics
Consistent with Arrow, MFA invokes an efficiency principle that derives its morality from
maximizing common interest. The morality of efficiency relies on the First Fundamental
Theorem (FFT) of welfare economics, that a perfectly competitive market economy exhibits
Pareto optimality. The invisible hand guides competitive prices to clear markets, maximizing
aggregate utility and minimizing overall resource waste.11 Locating the competitive market
within a larger social scheme of social welfare,12 markets are morally justified by their efficiency
contributions to social prosperity.13 Thus, FFT grounds the market’s macrosocial role in
achieving economic efficiency. In Coasian terms, firms complement markets with cooperatively
organized production that supersedes the price mechanism, contributing to Paretian welfare.14
Recall Arrow’s recognition that in privileging efficiency, markets cannot accommodate values
of fairness or justice;15 rather, markets approach public morality in a roundabout way. FFT
guarantees that firms pursuing profit indirectly achieve a societally optimal use of resources:
individual willingness to pay operationalizes societal need and profit approximates a firm’s
efficiency in using resources to satisfy needs.16
The Second Fundamental Theorem of welfare economics, that tax-and-transfer schemes can
secure optimal allocations, justifies limiting the scope of markets to concerns of efficiency.17
Under a division of moral labor, markets promote efficiency and the welfare state promotes
equality through structural changes and re-distribution.18 Thus, individuals are permitted to
Id., 25.
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suspend private moral principles of mutual aid, non-maleficence, and respect for autonomy19 to
seek profit in a competitive environment because markets’ efficiency contribution to the goals
of society confer an overarching morality.20 The macrosocial role of markets justify suspending
private morality within markets’ institutional context,21 and furthermore requires violations of
private moral requirements.22 While self-interested behavior sabotages close-knit cooperation,
benevolence hampers competitive efficiency.23 Large-scale cooperation amongst anonymous
actors requires ample self-interest24 for profit motives to, through competitive prices, produce
societally-desirable Pareto-efficiency.25
Self-interest is one ‘Pareto condition’ needed for perfect competition, clear markets, and
Pareto efficiency.26 Furthermore, the morally meaningful macrosocial role of markets creates
moral obligations to bring about Pareto conditions.27 These ‘efficiency imperatives,’
instantiations of the spirit of perfect competition in duties toward Pareto conditions, define
MFA’s ethics.28 Efficiency imperatives include principles prohibiting the pursuit and
exploitation of monopoly power,29 externalization,30 deception,31 and opportunism,32 which
inhibit perfect competition. Economic agents are expected to restrict their behavior for the
sake of perfectly competitive market efficiency.33 Individuals, firms, managers, and employees
should not exploit market failures for profit,34 because this undermines the moral foundation of
perfect competition that premises the morality of the price mechanism.
Corporate law is as a mechanism for restricting profit-maximization to strategies consistent
with Pareto conditions; however, legal mechanisms are blunt and costly.35 Accordingly, MFA
attempts to circumvent information costs through business internalized efficiency imperatives.
Business ethics thus supersedes legal mechanisms for regulating Pareto-violating profit-
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maximization strategies,36 internalizing enforcement of Pareto conditions where external
enforcement is unreasonably costly and even impossible. However, internalization creates
collective action problems. All actors have self-interested incentives to defect, since anyone
abiding by the high standards of Pareto competition would quickly be eliminated.37 Moreover,
this martyrdom would undermine actors’ moral-economic purpose of driving prices down
through competition. MFA attempts to respond by permitting individual noncompliance38 so
long as actors work toward the conditions for viable collective compliance with efficiency
imperatives.39 This ‘metavolutarism’ could include building cooperation through long-term
reciprocity, non-legal agreements, and industry self-regulation.40 Ultimately, MFA narrates a
moral cascade from FFT to high-level consequentialist principles, encoded into intermediate
deontological conditions,41 internalized in granular-level ethical imperatives.

Case Study: MFA on Agency Theory and Professionalism Norms
At the managerial level, MFA has been applied to solve the principal-agent problem and justify
the shareholder theory of managerial responsibility, by arguing that profit-maximization is not
managerial self-interest, but rather a professional obligation constrained by principal interests
and efficiency imperatives.42 Agency when advancing the principal interests intrinsically
necessitates trust,43 creating moral obligations to further shareholder interests44 that are
founded on the maximization of social welfare from competitive firms.45 If managers fail to
maximize profits, firms will be uncompetitive, markets will be inefficient, and social utility will
not be maximized.46 However, this straightforward promise breaks down in modern economies
where ownership and control are separate. Rational actors using private property to pursue
self-interest no longer guarantees maximal efficiency,47 creating a principal-agent confound for
the invisible hand mechanism of individual initiative in industrial enterprise.48
The ownership-control separation that creates the principle-agent problem can be traced back
to Frank Knight, who discussed the division of entrepreneurship into stockholder risk-bearing
36
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and managerial decision-making.49 In order to restore the Pareto promise underlying the moral
justification of markets, accountability mechanisms must bridge the ownership-control gap.50
As the shareholder-manager relationship is tighter than the stakeholder-manager
relationship,51 MFA promotes self-monitoring and self-enforcement to solve the principleagent problem, internalizing monitoring-enforcement costs using efficiency imperatives.
Managerial professional norms are derived through MFA, starting with the goal of Pareto
conditions and working backward to the implications for a firm in a market economy.52
The academic concept of professional norms dates back to institutional economists’
‘professionalism project’ of the early 20th century.53 Norms of business conduct including
integrity, honesty, trustworthiness, disinterestedness, transparency, competence, and duties of
care and loyalty create a trustworthy basis for impersonal, transactional relationships in an
institutional context that explicitly sanctions violations of private morality.54 Professional
norms are consistent with empirical findings that people exhibit cooperation, loyalty, and
opportunistic restraint even without external incentives.55 Accordingly, game theory
consistently overemphasizes monitoring-enforcement costs while underinvesting in trust,
loyalty, and professionalism,56 rationalizing, motivating, and fulfilling the rational-actor
prophecy.57
Rather, a team-oriented organizational culture of shared reciprocity and coordination values is
a distinct competitive advantage of firms.58 Simon conjectures that organizational
identification is a powerful mechanism for motivating employees to further organizational
goals.59 Pride in work and organizational loyalty supersede supervision and piecework reward in
addressing free-riding problems.60 Normative principles allow firm relationships to supersede
external incentive structures and adversarial bargaining.61 Thus, a professional ethos addresses
the principal-agent problem, allowing firms to maximize profits and contribute to competitive
markets that deliver efficiency to society.
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Irrelevance and Idealism: Critique of the Market Failures
Approach
The beauty of MFA is that its business ethics embody the logic of markets: if actors honor the
spirit of the market, the invisible hand produces morality alongside efficiency, addressing
macrosocial questions of social justice and microsocial question of ethical agency. However,
MFA rests on the significant assumption of Pareto conditions. The General Theory of Second
Best finds that, paradoxically, violating multiple Pareto conditions may produce more
efficiency than violating one Pareto condition.62 That is, under nonideal conditions, such as
empirical economies, additional purposeful market failures may increase efficiency.63 This nonlinear relationship between competition and efficiency destroys the ability of MFA to make
normative claims in real-world circumstances.64 MFA is useless in our second-best reality. It
can no longer promote efficiency imperatives; they are devoid of justification since they no
longer create Pareto efficiency.65 Re-defining ethics in terms of the moral justification of
markets turns MFA’s characteristic efficiency imperatives into mundane individual duties to
promote societal welfare, obviating MFA.66
The complete collapse of macrosocial objectives into microeconomic interactions demands that
economic actors fully internalized and constantly expressed the ideals of a perfect market. Yet,
the market’s competitive institutional context is diametrically opposed to efficiency
imperatives that strive toward collective welfare. The macro/micro-inconsistency of the firmmarket dichotomy is visible in several domains. Managers are morally obligated to be
cooperative within firms but competitive with other firms.67 Firm culture must be antithetical
to market culture; in order to address the principal-agent problem, professionalism norms
must counteract market opportunism.68 The internal inconsistency of MFA explains why extralegal mechanisms suggested to secure inter-firm ethical compliance are intrinsically untenable.
Non-legal agreements fall victim to the same regulatory costs from asymmetric information as
corporate law, and while long-term reciprocity and industry self-regulation reduce free-riding
opportunities by restricting the scope of the collective, they do not fundamentally eliminate
incentives to defect from cooperation. Inter-firm ethical compliance fails because it is
inherently inconsistent with the structure, goals, and practices of the market.
Furthermore, given the nonideal realities of a dynamic economy, the conscious negation of the
market’s invisible hand logic—that individuals need not concern themselves with high-level
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goals—is a futile sacrifice for Paretian efficiency. Theories of second- and third-best
approaches try to apply MFA to formulate a response to the general theory of second best,
deriving sets of imperatives from nonideal conditions.69 However, these iterations are
susceptible to infinite regress, and a time-slice reformation of ethical principles is broadly
unhelpful in a dynamic economy with complex, simultaneous change. The stopgap response of
MFA, which produces an imperative to fix each isolated condition that is causing deviation
from Pareto-efficient output, is overwhelmed by the sheer complexity of emergent systems. In
the Knightian sense of uncertainty, individual efforts to fix market failures cannot
meaningfully contribute to societal welfare.

Conclusion: Business Ethics for Dynamic Capitalism
While MFA recognizes the existence of market failures, it is overly and unreasonably idealistic
in believing that first-degree market failures can be fully absorbed by second-degree
internalization.70 MFA uses the promise of ideal theory under premises of nonideal theory.
However, efficiency imperatives cannot morally hold in an imperfect market where competition
does not maximize Paretian efficiency. It is a grand attempt to salvage Pareto conditions from
the general theory of second best, but it is beleaguered by fundamental internal inconsistencies.
Moving forward, MFA suggests that business ethics must answer the question of a macrosocial
justification for an institution that privileges efficiency, and the question of its corresponding
microeconomic imperatives at the individual level. The desire to create a macrosocial
justification for markets seems to stem from the perceived mismatch between the competitive
efficiency of markets and the welfarist norms of liberal democracy,71 which are becoming
increasingly outdated under neoliberalism. Though the pars construens is beyond the scope of
this paper, entrepreneurship presents a rich case study for analyzing dynamic competition
where the social benefits of creative destruction could form a moral foundation for business
ethics. An inquiry into business ethics under dynamic capitalism must first consider the metaethics of markets: if there should be a moral justification, if it lies in macrosocial welfare, and if
it is consistent with the nature and purpose of markets. While MFA provides a tempting story of
Paretian redemption, it is realistically untenable as a contemporary theory of business ethics.
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